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Lempert: Narrative Relevance

This paper has its roots in Old Chief v. United States, [2] a case the Supreme Court of
the United States decided in 1997. I will begin by describing this case; then comment on
its implications for the Supreme Court's conception of the jury, and conclude by
examining the agenda one may draw from it for empirical jury research. Old Chief arose
when Johnny Lynn Old Chief was charged not only with assault with a dangerous
weapon and using a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, but also with
violating a law that precludes convicted felons from possessing firearms. [3] To prove
the "felon in possession" charge, the government sought to introduce a record of Old
Chief's prior felony conviction which disclosed that he had been sentenced to five years
imprisonment for an unlawful assault that had resulted in serious bodily injury. [4] Old
Chief's defense was that he never possessed a gun, and he offered to stipulate to the fact
that he was a convicted felon and so would have violated the felon in possession law if
the jury found he had possessed a gun.
It is clear that under the American law of evidence, evidence of Old Chief's prior
conviction would have been inadmissible had he been charged only on the first two
counts and not as a "felon in possession." The prosecutor rejected the stipulation,
arguing that he had a right to prove this case with whatever relevant evidence he wished.
[5] The trial judge agreed with the prosecutor, and the appellate court affirmed. [6]
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Souter, reversed. [7] The
Court held that, despite the broad discretion that Federal Rule 403 gives trial judges in
deciding whether to exclude evidence because its probative value is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect, the trial judge could not reasonably have admitted
this evidence given the availability of the stipulation. [8] The Court was correct. The
proffered stipulation would have given the jury all the information it would have been
authorized to draw from evidence of the conviction-specifically that Old Chief had been
convicted of a felony and would be guilty under the statute if he possessed the gun. The
other information that the prosecutor got before the jury by presenting the conviction, the
nature of the prior offense, could only have prejudiced the jury by leading it to believe
that Old Chief was a violent person.
While Old Chief marked the first time the Court limited a trial court's discretion under
Federal Rule 403, [9] the Court attempted to limit the reach of the case, so that parties
could not use stipulations to exclude all evidence that carried with it substantial
prejudicial potential. [10] In so doing, the Supreme Court recognized a sense in which
evidence can be relevant which does not fit within the Federal Rule's core definition of
relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of an action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." [11] Specifically, the Court recognizes as
relevant evidence which relates to a case and which helps a party tell an involving and
coherent story, Justice Souter wrote:
The "fair and legitimate weight" of conventional evidence showing individual
thoughts and acts amounting to a crime reflects the fact that making a case with
testimony and tangible things not only satisfies the formal definition of an
offense, but tells a colorful story with descriptive richness .... Evidence . . has
force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a
narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support conclusions but to
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sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be,
necessary to reach an honest verdict. This persuasive power of the concrete and
particular is often essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that
the law places on them . . .. [T]he evidentiary account of what a defendant has
thought and done can accomplish what no set of abstract statement ever could, not
just to prove a fact but to establish its human significance, and so to implicate the
law's moral underpinnings and a juror's obligation to sit in judgment. Thus, the
prosecution may fairly seek to place its evidence before the jurors, as much to tell
a story of guiltiness as to support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors that
a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete
elements of a defendant's legal fault.
But there is somehing even more to the prosecution's interest in resisting efforts
to replace the evidence of its choice with admissions and stipulations, for . .
there lies the need for evidence in all its particularity to satisfy the jurors'
expectations about what proper proof should be. Some such demands they bring
with them to the courthouse, assuming, for example, that a charge of using a
firearm to commit an offense will be proven by introducing a gun in evidence. A
prosecutor who fails to produce one, or some good reason for his failure, has
something to be concerned about .... Expectations may also arise in jurors'
minds simply from the experience of a trial itself. The use of witnesses to describe
a train of events naturally related can raise the prospect of learning about every
ingredient of that natural sequence the same way. If suddenly the prosecution
presents some occurrence in the series differently, as by announcing a stipulation
or admission, the effect may be like saying, "never mind what's behind the door,'
and jurors may well wonder what they are being kept form knowing. A party
seemingly responsible for cloaking something has reason for apprehension, and
the prosecution with its burden of proof may prudently demur at a defense request
to interrupt the flow of evidence telling the story in the usual way.
In sum, the accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free
from any defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away rests on good sense. A
syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no match
for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it .... A convincing tale can
be told with economy, but when economy becomes a break in the natural
sequence of narrative evidence, an assurance that the missing link is really there is
never more than second best. [12]

I refer to the aspect of relevance Justice Souter described as narrativerelevance. The
justification for admitting such evidence, despite the possibility that it might
inappropriately sway jurors as it engages their emotions, is that the evidence is needed to
place more factually probative (or less prejudicial) evidence in the context of a
convincing narrative about what happened.
The first thing to note about the portion of Old Chief I have quoted is the image of the
jury implicit in Justice Souter's recognition of narrative relevance. The jury is not, as the
Court assumed in the jury size cases, a mechanical processor of information whose
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output, and all that matters, is the verdict. Nor is the jury easily biased or confused,
contrary to what one might assume from the great discretion recent Supreme Court cases
have given trial judges to exclude scientific evidence. [13]
Instead the jury is an active,
curious, and intelligent processor of information. The jury is motivated not just by its
duty to decide a case correctly but also by its interest in learning what happened. The
jury recognizes, deal in, and may be persuaded by, nuance. Jurors actively create their
own stories from the facts provided, and if some important item of evidence seems
missing or is under-emphasized, they may hold this failure against the party responsible
for it. The jury is, not unreasonably, suspicious when evidence is provided in strange or
unfamiliar ways, as by stipulations. Further, jurors not only wonder about information
they feel is being withheld, but they may also actively construct explanations for gaps in
the evidence. The jury does not merely process facts but also considers what is morally
reasonable. Above all, the jury evaluates stories not as specific strings of evidence but as
gestalts that hang together coherently or fail to do so. Consequently, parties have the
right in most cases--albeit not in Old Chiefitself- to present facts in the context of stories
with considerable texture. They may introduce material which supplies that texture even
when it does not fit the Federal Rule's definition of relevant evidence, and has substantial
potential for prejudice.
To illustrate what I think Old Chief allows, I believe it is not unfair to read the case to
say not only that prosecutors ordinarily have a right to show jurors bloody pictures of
crime scenes, but also that jurors may expect such pictures and are likely to see the
prosecution's case as weaker if the prosecution only provides them with verbal
descriptions of the crime scene. The prosecution suffers not because it is unable to
arouse the jury emotionally by showing gore but because cognitively the jury suspects
that the prosecution did not want them to know the full story. Moreover, the case suggest
that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the jurors appreciating the full brutality of
the crime that society may benefit if the bloody pictures better enable the jury to assess
the morality of the crime they are judging. Yet, the holding in Old Chief indicates that
jurors ordinarily should not rely on their assessment of a defendant's character to support
a conviction without regard to what they know of the crime.
So Old Chief takes us from the image of the jury, in some past cases, as a group of
relatively fragile lay decision-makers who, for example, may not properly discount
hearsay evidence [14] and are likely to be bamboozled by glib witnesses peddling junk
science. [15] It offers instead the image of a particularly robust decision maker who is
actively participating in the construction of an account of what occurred. Old Chief does
not deplore the effect of jurors' emotional and moral perspectives on their efforts to get at
the truth--a dramatic change from how the influence of emotion on legal fact-finding is
commonly regarded. Instead, it sees emotional involvement and morality judgments as
integral to the decisions we expect jurors to make. Jurors in Old Chief become fully
human.
From the perspective of social psychologists studying the jury, there's also much to take
from Old Chief. First, the court not only recognizes the story model of case presentation
associated with Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman, [16] and the story model of jury
decision making, which Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie [17] introduced about a
decade ago, but treats them as if they were established truths about what lawyers should
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do and how juries decide cases. These supposed truths are, of course, empirical
propositions. While it seems clear that lawyers strive to include evidence in their cases
that is only narratively relevant (if it is relevant at all), it is less clear how narratively
relevant evidence affects the jury's construction of stories. Hastie and Pennington
showed that the order in which evidence was presented affects the degree to which juries
are persuaded by it. [18] Evidence presented in story order is more persuasive than the
same evidence presented in witness order. [19] But we know little about whether a more
richly textured and presumably more interesting story is more persuasive with juries than
a story which has all the essential facts needed for a judgment, but is not richly supplied
with connecting narrative facts. (Studies of testimony, however, indicate that irrelevant
detail makes a witness's relevant testimony appear more credible that it would appear
without the detail.) [20]
Second, the idea of narrative relevance complicates some of the normative assumptions
students of the jury often make when investigating the quality of jury performance. For
example, suppose one wished to study whether juries were biased by attention-getting or
emotionally-arousing evidence. A simple paradigm for such a study might be to show
one group of mock jurors bloody pictures of a decapitated corpse while the second group
was only told that the victim's head had been cut off. If the first group was more prone
to convict than the second, the natural conclusion would be that the pictures aroused the
first group's emotions and improperly influenced their judgment of the weight of the
evidence. After Old Chief, it is not as easy to make this normative assumption. In light
of Justice Souter's analysis, it seems possible that the jury that saw the pictures was more
interested in the case as a whole, or better appreciated the coherence of the prosecution's
story, and therefore reached the better decision. Again we have an empirical question:
one that requires us to look at process rather than at outcome in assessing how ell juries
have performed. Moreover, even when one has access to process, it may not be easy to
determine the effects of narratively relevant evidence on the quality of jury decisions. If,
for example, jurors in the bloody picture condition argue more passionately for
conviction, or conversely easily reach a decision to convict without substantial argument,
have they done a better job than jurors in the witness condition who fail to convict
because the only passionate juror argues for acquittal or because they differ so much
among themselves that they cannot reach a decision. It could be that the latter jurors
have performed worse because they don't care as much about "getting it right."
A third area to which Justice Souter calls our attention concerns the implications of gaps
in stories. [21] Again, Judge Souter's analysis raises a wealth of empirical questions,
and we know little about most of them. What, for example, constitutes a significant story
gap? Is Justice Souter right in his suggestion that a jury will see a gap or feel cheated
when an essential fact that could be proved in a dramatic and potentially prejudicial
fashion is instead proved by stipulation? Will the quality of jury deliberations differ
depending on whether facts are proved by evidence or established by stipulation, and if
so, how? It is not at all clear that the quality of jury deliberations will be affected by the
jurors' sense that there is a gap in what has been provided them, because jurors may
appreciate that proof in courts of law has special characteristics which caution against
making inferences from how evidence is presented, and they may be willing to rely on
the evidence that they have heard, rather than drawing inferences from what they haven't
heard, so long as this is adequate to justify a verdict.
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Justice Souter suggests that jurors have rather strong expectations regarding what
evidence to be presented on what issues, generated either by their personal experiences or
by what the case they are hearing tells them about trial procedure. He illustrates what he
means with examples of jurors expecting that a gun will be introduced when a person is
charged with firearm violence, and expecting that witnesses will be used to prove all the
facts in a case because the first facts presented were proven in that manner. It would be
interesting to identify the expectations of proof jurors bring with them to the courtroom
or acquire in the course of a trial, and their reactions when their expectations are
disappointed. There are, for example, anecdotes of jurors being influenced by what they
have seen in actual or fictional televised trials. [22] Some lawyers implicity support
Souter's theory as they seem to assume that jurors' expectations will raise doubts if an
opponent has not presented evidence stereotypically associated with her case. Thus
defense counsel in criminal cases often defend, in part, by emphasizing gaps in the state's
story, such as the absence of fingerprint evidence in a burglary prosecution or the state's
failure to produce the gun used in an assault. [23] It is not clear, however, whether
defenses that essentially call the jury's attention to possible gaps in the other side's
presentation often succeed. Generalizing from the transcripts I have read, it often
appears that when a defense in a real trial consists largely of pointing to gaps in an
opponent's story, it is because other evidence tending to make a case for the defendant is
weak. In a close case, however, gaps in expected stories may make a difference. Again
we have a topic for empirical investigation. Although the literature includes reports of
mock jury deliberations in which jurors have raised questions about gaps in evidence, the
matter has not been systematically studied.
There is, however, another side to the gap issue which calls into question the admission
of narratively relevant evidence that Old Chiefcelebrates. Cognitive psychologists have
shown that subjects who have been given a large portion of a schema or story and asked
to recall what they were told tended to fill in gaps in information in a manner that fit
whatever the story led them to expect. When quizzed, they will remember hearing storyconsistent facts they were never told. [24] It is possible that an engrossing, narratively
rich trial story may foster similar tendencies. Jurors who hear a large portion of a
familiar story, but not its entirety, may recall story-consistent information that was not
presented to them or they may assume that such information exists. [25] In addition,
narratively rich information may produce an unduly strong tendency in jurors to credit
story-consistent testimony or information even though it clasheswith what, without the
context of the story, would be more persuasive evidence. In Old Chief, for example, if
the jurors heard that Old Chief's felony was a crime of violence, they might, on that
account, have credited the testimony of an eye witness who claimed to have seen Old
Chief with a gun in his hand rather than what they otherwise might have found to be the
more credible testimony; that of two eyewitnesses who swore Old Chief had no gun. [26]
So the best reason to exclude the evidence of the specific prior felony committed by Old
Chief may not have been the possibility of prejudice in the sense of creating a proconviction bias, but, instead, because of the cognitive implications of this narratively rich
evidence when the jury, in good faith, evaluated the probative value of other evidence in
the case. Here too, is an area that cries out for empirical investigation.
In his discussion of narratively relevant evidence, Justice Souter assumes that such
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evidence would benefit the offeror's case more than a stipulation would, and parties
rejecting stipulations certainly make that assumption. But is the assumption categorically
correct? Might not an uncontested stipulation provided with the judge's imprimatur
carry greater weight than seemingly more vivid testimony which is questioned vigorously
on cross-examination? We don't know. Nor do we know whether narratively relevant
evidence's persuasive power stems from the virtues that Justice Souter recites, such as its
attention-stimulating features, or its amelioration of gaps that either confuse juries or else
leave them speculating about the likely implications of missing evidence or the motive of
the party who did not present it. Evidence that would be inadmissible but for its narrative
relevance may persuade juries for less palatable reasons: it conduces to unwarranted gap
filling or to prejudicial aspects of the evidence. Before Old Chief, it was generally
assumed that parties who tried to avoid accepting stipulations to important facts did so
because they sought to present less binding but more vivid proof.
Another virtue of narrative relevance for Justice Souter is that colorful stories with
descriptive richness can sustain the willingness of jurors to draw whatever inferences are
necessary to reach an honest verdict. [27] It is not clear why jurors would be unwilling
to draw the inferences essential to reach honest verdicts or how narratively relevant
evidence has the effect that Justice Souter posits. Two possibilities come to mind. The
first is cognitive; mental work is required to draw inferences form facts. Jurors exposed
to richly descriptive evidence may be more motivated to do this work than jurors who
have heard a more bare bones story, or they may have less work to do because the
additional facts trigger scripts stored in their memories. But the converse is also
possible. It may take more cognitive work to focus on the facts needed to make
necessary inferences when they are embedded in a captivating story or if they trigger a
legally inappropriate script than when they are presented in starker fashion. The second
explanation is motivational. Evidence that involves a juror as a whole person may be
needed to counteract jurors' emotions in situations where they would otherwise be
reluctant to draw valid inferences, such as the inference that a person who assists at a
mercy killing has an intent to kill. For example, Dr. Kevorkian' s recent conviction after
four jury acquittals may have happened because the prosecution had a movie of the
doctor actually killing a "patient" rather than just a description of what occurred.
Alternatively, the trial court prevented Dr. Kevorkian from presenting evidence that was
narratively relevant from his perspective; namely, evidence from the deceased's close
family members about his condition and desires and their sense that what Dr. Kevorkian
did was a blessing that brought peace to a loved one. Finally, Dr. Kevorkian's more
active role in bringing about death in the killing for which he was convicted might have
been critical-earlier, he had "merely" constructed lethal machines that a person wanting
to die could trigger. Perhaps even a colorless description of how Dr. Kevorkian had
acted to bring about the death he was most recently tried for would also have resulted in a
conviction. Again in Justice Souter's speculations there are rich possibilities for
empirical investigation.
The law of evidence and the behavior of juries have been persistent themes in the
teaching and research that I have done throughout my career. Old Chiefbrings them
together in a way I find fascinating. As an evidence case, it recognizes limits to the
judge's discretion under FRE 403 when evidence despite its prejudicial potential is
unlikely to raise strong emotions. It also departs from the literal reading of the Federal
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rules that dominates most of the Supreme Court's recent rulings interpreting these rules.
Instead the Court recognizes a new aspect of relevance that relates more to the actual
persuasiveness of evidence than to its abstract tendency to make a fact in issue more or
less likely than it would be without the evidence. As a case on the role of the jury, Old
Chief presents a different image of the jury from the view that commonly seems to
motivate Supreme Court decisions. It calls into question what seemed to be wellestablished norms regarding the appropriate influence of different kinds of evidence on
jurors. The Old Chief Court also places its imprimatur on the story model of jury
decision making, and in doing so suggest new questions for empirical research on juries
and gives a new urgency to further research about old question. Few cases in recent
memory have raised more intriguing questions about how juries respond to evidence.

[1] Francis A. Allen Collegiate Professor of Law, and Professor of Sociology, The
University of Michigan. I would like to thank Craig Callen for the very careful reading he
gave this paper and for his many useful suggestions for improvement as well as for the
help several of his students gave me in tracking down citations.
[2]

519 U.S. 172 (1997).

[3]

Id. at 174

[4]

Id. at 177.

[5]

Id.

[6]

Id.

[7]

Id. at 178.

[8]

Id. at 191-92.

[9]

Fed R. Evid. 403.

[10]

Old Chief 519 U.S. at 192.

[11]

Fed. R. Evid. 401.

[12]

Old Chief, 519 U. S. at 187-89.

[13]

General Electric v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997).

[14]

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 132-33 (1968).

[15] See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S., 579, 595 (1993)(trial
court should be more willing to use Rule 403 to exclude expert testimony, in light of
degree to which it may be misleading, than to exclude lay witness testimony)(quoting
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Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the FederalRules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be
Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1992)).
[16] See W. Lance Bennett & Martha Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the
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Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188.

[24] See F.C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology.
(1932); G.H. Bower, J.B. Black, & J.T. Turner, Scripts in Memory for Text 11 Cognitive
Psychol. 177 (1979). J.D, Bransford, J.R. Barclay, & J.J. Franks, Sentence Memory: A
Constructive Versus InterpretiveApproach, 3 Cognitive Psychol. 193 (1972); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-BasedDecision Making Effects of Memory
Structure on Judgment, 14 J. Experimental Psychol.: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
521 (1988); A. C. Graesser, M. Singer & T. Trabasso ConstructingInferences during
Narrative Text Comprehension, 101 Psychol. Rev. 371 (1994). Some psychologists,
however, suggest that little gap filling occurs. For a general review see, E. Tory Higgins
and John A. Bargh, Social Cognition and Social Perception, 38 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 369
(1987).
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Pennington & Hastie, supra note 17, at 519.
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